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FILIP v. GAGNE
thority in Maryland allowing such an appeal has been
found.
The appellants might possibly have appealed as origi-
nal petitioners.4 9 Statutory provisions giving a right of
appeal to the Maryland Court of Appeals to a party to an
equitable action have been construed as not restricting the
right to the technical parties to the action, and a person
interested in the subject matter of the action may main-
tain an appeal even though he was not one of the original
parties to it."° It would have been a matter of evidence and
argument for the appellants, as original petitioners, to
show how, as wife and business associate, they would be
personally interested or aggrieved by an erroneous decree
which restored the appellee to capacity.
ALLEN L. ScHwArr
Estate Of Incompetent Liable For Torts Of Conservator
Filip v. Gagne'
In 1958, the plaintiff, a tenant in a tenement building
owned by an elderly woman under conservatorship since
1951, was injured by a fall alleged to have been caused by
defective construction and maintenance of a common stair-
way. In suits against both the ward and the conservator,
the lower court reserved decision pending determination
of questions of law by the Supreme Court of New Hamp-
shire as to the liability of the conservator for defective
conditions due to her negligence, and as to the chargeability
of the ward and her estate for such negligence. That
Court, in a unanimous opinion, held that: (1) a conserv-
ator, having the duty to preserve and maintain the estate
(in this case, to rent the tenement to produce income) also
has a duty of care to prevent injury caused by defective
conditions, and is personally liable for her own negligence; 2
(2) a ward would be liable under the modern doctrine that
0 In Wattrich v. Blakney, supra, n. 37 the court stated that the petitioner,
guardian and sister of the appellee, could not appeal in her individual
capacity since no personal aggrievance was asserted by the petitioner.
From this it seems that Ithe petitioner must expressly assert how he
was personally aggrieved.
50 Weinberg v. Fanning, 208 Md. 567, 119 A. 2d 383 (1956) ; Lickle v.
Boene, 187 Md. 579, 51 A. 2d 162 (1947) ; Preston v. Poe, 116 Md. 1, 81 A.
178 (1911) ; Hall v. Jack, 32 Md. 253 (1870). The appellants, as original
petitioners would, of course have had to make a timely appeal, i.e., within
30 days from the date of the lower court's judgment pursuant to MD.
RuL, 812a.
1104 N.H. 14, 177 A. 2d 509 (1962).
2 Id., 511; RESTATEMENT, ToRTs (1934) § 387, p. 1035 and § 383, p. 1022.
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an incompetent is liable for compensatory damages for his
torts;3 and (3) the modern tendency 4 is to hold a trust
estate responsible for torts committed by the trustee in
the administration of the trust, and that a conservator is
similar to a trustee, although he has no title to real estate,
and the estate should be answerable for neglect of his fi-
duciary duties.5
There is limited authority on the question of the liability
of the estate of an incompetent under guardianship for the
guardian's torts committed within the scope of his duties.
The New Hampshire Court, in imposing liability upon the
estate of a ward under conservatorship appears to be con-
trary to the approach taken by most courts.6
A situation very similar to that in the instant case came
before a New York court in 1906,7 and it was there held,
by means of an analogy to the principles governing lessor-
lessee responsibilities, that the lunatic was not liable." The
court reasoned that since a lessor is liable only for defective
conditions existing at the time of the demise and is not
liable for injuries resulting from negligence of tenants in
maintaining the premises,9 therefore one who does not
select the person representing him certainly should not be
liable.10 The committee was held not liable in its repre-
sentative capacity, the court reasoning that even trustees
of an express trust in real estate, in whom legal title is
vested, are not liable in their representative capacity for
negligence in keeping the premises in repair," so that
8 Noting that this is a subject upon which there is much disagreement,
the Court states that this is the "better" view, which has now received
acceptance by the American Law Institute. RESTATEMENT, TORTS, 2d
(Tentative Draft No. 4, 1959) § 283B. The Court can find no distinction
between the case of an incompetent managing his own affairs and one
who is under guardianship. Apparently, the fact that one is under
guardianship does not abrogate his duty of care. Query: If the ward is
personally liable, why is it necessary to consider whether his estate is
chargeable for the conservator's torts?
'3 ScoTT, TnuSTS (2d ed. 1956) § 271A-2, p. 2101.
Supra, n. 1, 512.
'Anno., 40 A.L.R. 2d 1094 (1954).
Ward v. Rogers, 51 Misc. 299, 100 N.Y.S. 1058 (1906). The only signifi-
cant difference was that in the Gagne case, the conservatorship was a
voluntary arrangement, while in Rogers, the committee was appointed.
See infra, n. 33.
'Id., 1060. The question of personal liability of the committee did not
arise in the Rogers case, as the suit was brought against the lunatic
or his committee in a representative capacity.
0 The court states that the lunatic might be liable for injuries resulting
from conditions existing prior to the guardianship, citing Morain v.
Devlin, 132 M'ass. 87, 42 Am. Rep. 423 (1882) (see n. 25, infra), and took
the accepted view that a lunatic is as responsible for his own torts as a
sane person.
"Supra, n. 7, 1059.
Moniot v. Jackson, 40 Misc. 197, 81 N.Y.S. 688 (1903).
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clearly a committee or guardian, not holding title to land,
would not be liable. 12
In a malicious attachment case in North Carolina, 3 the
court, citing Ward v. Rogers14 and the Maryland case of
Gillet v. Shaw,", found it to be the general rule that the
estate of an incompetent is not liable for torts of his guard-
ian committed in the management of the estate, and
therefore an action will not lie against the guardian in
his representative capacity. However, the guardian would
be personally liable for his own torts committed in the
management of the estate of the ward. 6
Rooney v. People's Trust Co.,7 a New York decision
handed down only two years after Rogers, took issue with
that case. Stating that title to property is not the criterion,
but that liability rests entirely upon exclusive control and
right of management, the court held the committee individ-
ually liable. 8 The court, however, said that there could be
no recovery against the committee representatively, since
the "estate of the incompetent must not be subjected to a
liability for the torts of one who is not his agent in the
legal sense.'19
The Maryland Court of Appeals was faced with a simi-
lar question in Gillet v. Shaw,20 decided in 1912. In that
case, an automobile operated by a chauffeur employed by
the guardian of an adjudged lunatic21 ran into and injured
the plaintiff. It was held that neither the lunatic, who was
not at the scene of the accident, nor his estate could be
rendered liable by the tort of his guardian's servant, and
by dicta, the court's reasoning was extended to torts of the
guardian himself.22 The court recognized that a lunatic is
liable for his own tortious negligence and is subject to the
same degree of care as a fully competent person, in order
that there may be redress for injuries.2 3 However, this rule
was held to have no application where an employee of the
guardian, not under the direction of the lunatic, committed
the tort. The reasoning is that an adjudged lunatic has no
"Supra, n. 7, 1060.
3Brown v. Guaranty Estates Oorp., 239 N.C. 595, 80 S.E. 2d 645, 40
A.L.R. 2d 1094 (1954).
"Supra, n. 7.
"117 Md. 508,83 A. 394 (1912).
l Supra, n. 13, 652.
"61 Misc. 159, 114 N.Y.S. 612 (1908).
Id., 613.
"Id., 614. This is dictum, the suit having been brought against the
committee individually.
117 Md. 508, 83 A. 394 (1912).
21 Adjudged insane by a Massachusetts court.
"Supra, n. 20, 514.
2Supra, n. 20, 512. Cross v. Kent, 32 Md. 581, 583 (1870).
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capacity to contract and cannot appoint an agent as long
as his lunacy continues.24
Morain v. Devlin25 is a frequently cited American case
taking the minority view that the estate of the incompetent
is liable. The basis of that decision is that there is no
reason to exempt the lunatic from the responsibilities of
having an estate when he receives the benefits of the prop-
erty. This case has been distinguished (although not by
the instant case) because it may have involved pre-existing
defective conditions.26 In a 1918 California case,27 involving
defective operation of an elevator in a building owned by
the lunatic defendant, the court found the estate liable,
making an analogy to the responsibilities of a receiver of
a railroad in conducting its business as a carrier of pass-
engers for hire, pointing out that judgments against the
receiver are payable only from funds in his hands.28 The
court emphasized that the lunatic was benefiting from
the operation of the elevator, distinguishing Gillet where
no service was performed for the lunatic.29 "If an in-
sane . . . owner and manager of a business building
would be responsible ... there seems no good reason
that he should be exempt . . . because . . . his property
was being operated for him by an agent appointed by the
court."3
0
The cases finding no liability, including Gillet v. Shaw,3
appear to be grounded on concepts borrowed from the law
of agency and hold that one who does not have the capacity
to appoint a manager or to control the management of his
estate should not be held responsible for the negligence of
one acting in his stead without his authority.2 This argu-
ment would seem to lose some of its force under the facts
existing in the instant case. Under the New Hampshire
I Id., 513. Here the court cites numerous authorities on the inability
of a lunatic to appoint an agent. Reams v. Taylor, 31 Utah 288, 87 P.
1089, 1090 (1906) supports the view that the doctrine of principal and
agent does not apply where an incompetent had no capacity to appoint an
agent.
2132 Mass. 87, 42 Am. Rep. 423 (1882).
2See supra, n. 9.
2Campbell v. Bradbury, 179 Cal. 364, 176 P. 685 (1918).
2Id., 687. The guardian here was held not personally liable.
2Ward v. Rogers was distinguished as growing out of property and not
involving the conduct of a business in the nature of a common carrier of
passengers for hire. Ibid.
"0Id., 688. Cf. 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS (1956) § 26.12, p. 1413, dis-
cussing the vicarious liability of infants.
117 Md. 508, 83 A. 394 (1912).
"Query: Would not the particular factual situation in the Gagne case
preclude this argument, since the landlord's duty of care to keep common
approaches in a reasonable condition is non-delegable? HARPER & JAMES,
op. cit. supra, n. 30, § 26.11, pp. 1406-1407; PROSSER, TORTS (2d ed. 1955)
§ 80, p. 476.
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statute,3 the appointment of a conservator differs from that
of a guardian in that conservatorship is a voluntary ar-
rangement, initiated by petition of one physically or men-
tally "infirm," but not mentally incompetent, and subject
to termination upon petition by the ward. Prior to the 1962
session of the General Assembly, Maryland had in force a
statute almost identical in effect to that of New Hamp-
shire.3 4 The voluntary nature of conservatorship under
these statutes would appear to greatly weaken the appli-
cation of the view of the majority cases in respect to such
situations. However, in the instant case, while recognizing
this difference, the court did not place any significance upon
it. " It may be that the existence of a statutory provision
equating the authority of conservators with that of guard-
ians impairs a distinction . 6 It is arguable that the con-
servator, although appointed voluntarily, is not an "agent,"
inasmuch as his actions are not subject to direction by the
ward,37 save for the possibility of a petition for termination
of the conservatorship. However, an argument can be made
that a ward who is competent, upon observing defective
conditions, owes a duty of care to third persons to see that
defects are remedied, even if this requires a petition for
termination.8
"4 N.H.R.S.A. (1955) c. 464:17: "Whenever any person shall deem
himself unfitted by reason of infirmities of age, or by other mental or
physical disability, for the management of his affairs with prudence and
understanding, he may apply to the probate court for the appointment of
a conservator of his property, and thereupon the judge . . . may . . .
appoint some suitable person. . . ." § 20: "[T]he conservator shall
have the same powers and authority as the guardian of the property of
a minor or incompetent and shall be considered as an officer or arm
of the court." Section 18 provides that the conservator will be subject
to all provisions relating to guardians in so far as they apply to estates.
Section 21 provides for termination of the conservatorship upon petition
of the ward at any time.
" 2 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 16, § 149 et seq. contains provisions as to the
appointment and duties of a conservator, and the termination of the
conservatorship, very similar to that of New Hampshire. However, by
an act of the 1962 legislature (ch. 36, § 15 and § 1) this was repealed,
and replaced by a new statute, which will probably have the same effect,
although the right of one to petition for his property to be placed under
conservatorship is relegated to the status of a rule of procedure (MD.
RULE L-70), as was the provision as to discharge (MD. RuiE 1-73). The
new section 150 specifically enumerates the power of the conservator to
sue and be sued in his representative capacity.
104 N.H. 14, 177 A. 2d 509, 510 (1962).
M Supra, n. 33; In re Anderson's Guardianship, 247 Iowa 1292, 78 NW.
2d 788, 791 (1956); Anderson v. Schweitzer, 236 Iowa 765, 20 N.W. 2d
67, 69 (1945). The former case holds that the powers and duties of volun-
tary and involuntary guardians are the same, but admits that a "different
situation" is created by a ward who is mentally alert from that of an
incompetent.
"See the dissent in McOabe v. O'Connor, 4 App. Div. 354, 38 N.Y.S.
572, 575 (1896), aff'd 162 N.Y. 600, 57 N.E. 1116 (1900).
8Cf. supra, n. 32.
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The benefits-responsibilities approach of the instant
case and the Morain case certainly has merit, inasmuch as
it is generally accepted that an incompetent managing his
own affairs would be liable for his torts in relation thereto.
Certainly there is no reason to shield him from liability
(especially in a conservatorship case) merely because his
estate requires the management of a guardian.39
In the instant case, the court finds that the estate of the
ward should be chargeable for the conservator's torts, ex-
tending what it terms "the modern tendency" in the law
of trusts to the guardianship area. The analogy of trusts
and guardianships has broad acceptance ° despite the fact
that the guardian has no title to the ward's property. How-
ever, the concept of responsibility of a trust estate for torts
committed by the trustee in the administration of the trust,
as espoused by Professor Scott4 and supported by the
American Law Institute,42 is accepted only by an apparently
small minority of jurisdictions." This view may well be
an extension of the principle that a trustee who has become
liable when not personally at fault is entitled to indemnity
from the trust estate.4 4 If a guardian is to be treated as a
trustee, then likewise the indemnity principle should be
applicable in an appropriate situation.5
It is suggested that the distinction between involuntary
guardianship and conservatorship be disregarded inasmuch
as statutory wording seems to favor this,46 and the agency
approach of the majority is unrealistic. 47
While the result in the instant case satisfies the primary
object of assuring compensation to the wronged party, the
question of the ward's right to recover against a conserva-
tor or guardian whose mismanagement caused the liability
12 HIAREM & JAMES, TORTS (1956) § 26.12, p. 1412.
'
0 BOGERT, TRuSTS (3d ed. 1952) § 17, p. 39. This was long ago expressed
in Maryland. Swan v. Dent and Richards, 2 Md. Ch. 111, 117 (1847).
13 ScoTT, TRuSTS (2d ed. 1956) § 271A-2, p. 2101.
"RESTATEMENT, TnUSTS, 2d, § 271A, p. 23: "A person to whom the
trustee has incurred a liability in the course of ,the administration of the
trust may be permitted to obtain satisfaction of his claim out of the
trust estate if it is equitable to permit him to do so .. " This is based
on an analogy to an agent acting within the scope of his authority. Com-
ment a.
18 BOGERT, op. cit. supra, n. 40, § 129, pp. 504-506. For exhaustive con-
sideration of this knotty problem, see Annotations, 44 A.L.R. 637 (1926)
and 127 A.L.R. 687 (1940).
"3 ScoTT, TRUSTS (2d ed. 1956) § 268, p. 2071 et 8eq.
"For example, see Gillet v. Sh'aw, 117 Md. 508, 83 A. 394 (1912),
discussed supra, ns. 20-24, where the guardian could have been held liable
under doctrine of respondeat superior for the tort committed by his
servant.
Supra, n. 33.
Supra, n. 37.
RECENT DECISIONS
remains unanswered."' In order to effect an equitable solu-
tion, it appears necessary to provide the ward with such
a right where the guardian is personally at fault.
JON HARLAN LIVEZEY
Recent Decisions
Constitutional Law - Proof Necessary To Show Advo-
cating Forcible Overthrow Of Government Under The
Smith Act. Hellman v. U. S., 298 F. 2d 810 (9th Cir. 1962).
The defendant was a member of the Communist Party and
served as an organizer for the states of Montana and Idaho.
Among other things, he taught in Party schools, recruited
members, participated in the Party underground and dis-
tributed Party literature. Defendant was convicted for
violation of the membership clause of the Smith Act [18
U.S.C.A. § 2385, 3]. On appeal, defendant contended that
the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction. The
United States Court of Appeals in reversing, held that the
evidence was insufficient to support the indispensable find-
ing, that, during the period covered by the indictment, the
defendant personally had the specific intent to bring about
the violent overthrow of the government "as speedily as
circumstances would permit," relying on Scales v. U.S.,
367 U.S. 203 (1961). Scales, supra, 220, 252, sustained an
instruction of the trial court which stated that two ele-
ments must be proved to convict under the membership
clause: First, it is necessary to prove that a society, group
or assembly of persons advocated the violent overthrow of
the government, in the sense of present advocacy to action
to accomplish the end at least as soon as it determined cir-
cumstances were propitious; and Second, that defendant
was an active member of the society (and not merely a
nominal, passive, inactive or purely technical member)
with knowledge of the organization's illegal advocacy and
a specific intent to bring about violent overthrow of the
government at some propitious time at the society's com-
mand. [The instant case's requirement of "as speedily as
circumstances would permit" would seem to go beyond the
holding of the Scales case, although this did not control the
result.]
"13 ScoTT, TRUSTS (2d ed. 1956) § 247, p. 1977. That question and the
problem of recovery by the ward against the guardian for mismanagement
are beyond the scope of this note.
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